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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the role of network externalities and expectations
about them in the formulation of trade policy. Their effects arestudied in
duopoly situations when products are compatible and when they areincompatible
and when multimarket effects are possible.
Network externalities and expectations regarding the size of thenetwork
affect optimal trade policy in three ways. First, the presence of
expectations effects creates a role for policy if there aredifferences
between the way the externalities operate and expectations about how they
operate. Second, when goods are compatible, the existenceof network
externalities can make goods complementary which reverses the directionof
optimal policy. lhird, since multimarket effects occur naturallywith netowrk
externalities and compatible products, purely domestic policies, which are






Cambridge, MA 02138Kala Krishna
High Tech Trade Policy
Section 1
Introduction
With some 90 nations about to embark on a new round of multilateral
trade negotiations under GATT, there is concern that rules for "high tech"
industries be high on the agenda. The United States has been the leader in
expressing this view because it perceives that the products of its high tech
industries will have (or could have) a long—run comparative advantage. Aho
and Aronson (1985, p. 44) point out that "The United States pushed for work
on high technology at the 1982 GATT Ministerial Meeting, but did not
convince other countries that high technology industries should be handled
any differently from other industries." In fact, they say that "the
initiative was so poorly defined that LOC (less developed countries)
representatives asked how high technology discussions could be related to
transfer of technology, which is a legitimate question but not what the
United States had in mind." More recently, in March 1984, the U.S.
government officially called for new GATT negotiations in the area of high
tech goods. The United States informed the GAIT Council meeting at that
time that it would begin bilateral trade talks. on high tech goods with
interested delegations. These were to be the basis for future council
discussions. Other countries, however, questioned the urgency of these—2—
negotiations.
Why is it useful to think of high tech trade separately, and why has
the interest in trade policy for these industries been on the upswing? The
two questions are closely related. There are two reasons for this increase
in interest. First, trade in these products has been a growing part of
total trade. Second, a number of high tech industries possess certain
characteristics that provide opportunities for currently legal (under GAIT
rules) and profitable unilateral trade policy that could be harmful to all
parties in the international arena if practiced by all parties. In other
words, these characteristics make the industries "fall between the cracks"
of trading arrangements that are meant to prevent such suboptimal situations
from arising. The importance of high tech trade and the sector's special
characteristics indicate that policy for this sector should be thought of
separately and take into account its special characteristics.
It remains to identify the characteristics that make some high tech
industries special. The first characteristic is that network externalities
play a significant role in determining the demand for the products of these
industries. Network externalities are said to exist when the utility that a
user derives from consuming a good and the user's willingness to pay for a
good increases with the number of people who also consume the good or are
expected to do so. These externalities arise in a number of ways, both
directly and indirectly. In communications equipment, such as telephones,
they arise directly. People derive a greater benefit from a phone if all
the people they wish to communicate with also possess a phone. Theymay
arise indirectly, for example, if the amount of software produced is related—3—
to the number of computers in use, so that increases in the numberof
computers would increase the available stock of softwarewhich in turn would
raise the willingness to pay for a computer.
Such network externalities arise for many products that are not "high
tech" —-forexample, they arise for many durable goods since the
availability of servicing for any durable good is likely to be related to
the number of units of the good already sold in themarket.1 The network
externalities are especially important, however, in such key high tech
industries as computers and telecommunications systems. In part, this is
because these and a number of other high tech goods are information-related,
and goods with this characteristic tend to have Qreater network
externalities.
For industries in which network externalities are important,
expectations about the size of the network, i.e., the number ofunits of the
good sold, are a major determinant of the demand for suchgoods.2 This
paper analyzes how network externalities and expectationsabout their size
can provide a special role for trade policy. The conditionsfor such a role
to exist are shown to be quite severe. Other characteristics of hightech
industries that may also serve as the basis for government intervention in
international trade are briefly mentioned at the end of the paper.
Recent work in international trade theory has led both academicsand
policy makers to a better understanding of trade policy in imperfectly
competitive markets.3 It is now understood that to the extentthat national
interests do not include the well being of foreigners, in particular of
foreign firms, there may be a case for trying to draw awaythe profits of—4-
foreign firms. This can be done directly, or if this is illegal,
indirectly, by altering the behavior of domestic firms in order to improve
their strategic position. Attention has focused on the use of taxes and
subsidies for such purposes.
This point was first made in Brander and Spencer (1985) who showed that
in a particular strategic setting government subsidization of a domestic
firm competing with a foreign firm in a foreign market would improve its
strategic position if no other governments attempted this as well. As might
be expected, this conclusion aroused a good deal of interest in many circles.
It has become clear through recent work4 that the appropriateness of
this kind of policy depends very much on the nature of the strategic
setting. Loosely speaking, if the firms5 choose their actions on the basis
of incorrect beliefs about the actions of other firms and the government
understands how these are incorrect and can precommit to tax/subsidy
schemes, there is a role for government policy to correct the distortion
arising from the incorrect beliefs of the firms. If, for example, a
domestic firm expects its foreign rival to keep its sales constant as it
raises its sales, while in fact its foreign competitors tend to reduce their
sales whenever this happens, a wedge exists that can be exploited by a
knowledgeable government. In this case the government would give the
domestic firm a strategic advantage by subsidizing it.In contrast, if the
foreign competitor raised its sales with those of the domestic firm, the
optimal policy would be imposition of a tax.
The existence of consumer expectations about network size creates
another possible role for government policy. In industries where-5-
expectations of network externalities are important, firms may believe that
they are unable to influence expectations. This may be an incorrect
assumption. If, for example, firms believe that an increase in their output
will not increase the expected network size on which consumers base their
purchasing decisions, while consumers really do adjust their expectations
about network size in response to output changes, then there is a role for a
government that knows the true relationship to offset the incorrect beliefs
of firms with a subsidy that would induce the firms to produce more.
Another possibility, that in view of existing GATT rules is perhaps
more disturbing, relates to the existence of strategic multimarket
interactions.6 Such interactions are bound to be important in those high
tech industries where expected network size affects demand in all markets,
domestic and foreign. There is a possible role for the government in trying
to shift profits from foreign to domestic firms by an appropriate policy for
domestic firms exporting to foreign markets. Under these conditions a
purely domestic policy, such as a tax/subsidy on consumption for the
domestic market only will have repercussions for the firm's behavior in
foreign markets.
The basic idea can be understood quite easily with a simple example.
Consider a situation where the individual firm takes expectations about
network size as given. The firm is assumed to compete in both foreign and
domestic markets. Network expectations adjust to network size so that in
equilibrium the expected network size is the actual one. If the government
subsidizes only national sales of the product, the firm will produce more.7
This, in turn, will raise expectations about the network size of the product—6-
at home and abroad, and therefore affect the product's international
competitiveness. This natural interdependence of markets via network
effects could possibly be used strategically by a government to affect a
firm's behavior in international markets so as to promote the national
interest.8
This possibility is particularly disturbing, since trade laws are
designed to deal with direct government subsidization of exported goods, but
are not framed in a way to deal with purely domestic policies that have
indirect international effects. Under GAIT rules, countervailing duties are
allowed if there is a foreign subsidy on a product and imports of the
product cause material injury or retardation of growth to the domestic
industry producing the same good. Thinly disguised subsidies to exports
are prevented under this clause. An example is the x radial steel-belted
tires case in which Canada subsidized a tire company to build a new factory
in an area with high unemployment. Since virtually all of the product was
to be exported and likely to cause material injury, it was found to be
countervailable. The countervailing duty provisions clause cannot be used,
however, in the case of "purely domestic" policies, i.e., where the subsidy
applies only to goods consumed domestically. This leaves only the last
resort, the escape clauses, as the means to deal with such policies. These
provisions can be used if increased imports cause or threaten serious injury
to domestic producers or if increased imports threaten national security.
The requirements for obtaining protection via these two routes are quite
stringent, however. Thus, "purely domestic" policies with favorable effects
on international competitiveness could look quite attractive as a means of—7—
promoting exports.
The next sections present a simple model that helps isolate and
interpret the effects of network externalities and expectations on optimal
trade policy. Two versions of the model are considered in the next two
sections. Section 2 examines the implications for profit-shifting
possibilities of the two previously mentioned characteristics of high tech
industries; network externalities and expectations about them. Section 3
contains an analysis of the nature of multimarkets interactions that occur
due to these characteristics and the implications of these interactions for
trade policy. The last section discusses some other characteristics of high
tech industries and the problems they may and do cause for trade policy.—8—
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Section 2
Expectations, Network Externalities and Profit-Shifting
Recent work on the role of government policy when oligopolistic firms
operate in international markets has focused on the possibility of
profit-shifting from foreign to domestic firms and on the tradeoff between
the gains to domestic firms from such profit-shifting and the losses to
domestic consumers. A number of recent papers have developed this idea.
One of the earliest papers is by Brander and Spencer (1985), who show in a
model with one home firm and one foreign firm acting as Cournot duopolists
and competing in a third market, that the optimal government policy is to
subsidize exports. Dixit (1984) extends this result to cases with many
firms and shows that the same result holds as long as the number of domestic
firms is not too great. Eaton and Grossman (1986), in an insightful paper,
show that the Brander and Spencer result can be interpreted as a special
case of a more general policy. Their basic interpretation is in terms of a
government acting in response to differences between conjectured and actual
responses of foreign firms to changes in the domestic firms' output when
they are competing in a third market.9 They also develop a number of
extensions, including allowing for many firms and domestic consumption.
As argued previously, demand for a firm's product depends on the
expected size of the "network," that is, the expected number of units of
compatible goods sold. These expectations are very important in industries
with network externalities. Government intervention may be useful in—9-
influencing these expectations. This idea is explored in this section using
a model that embeds the Eaton and Grossman model in it.'° Use is made of the
simplest version of the model that makes the point, namely, the case where a
domestic and foreign firm compete in a third market and there is no
consumption of the product in either the home or foreign country.
Extensions along the lines of allowing more firms or domestic consumption
are possible, and the interested reader can use Eaton and Grossman (1984) as
a guide to do so. The next section analyzes multimarket interactions with
firms competing in both domestic and foreign market.
When network externalities exist, a consumer's willingness to pay for a
product depends on the expected network size for the product. The products of
the two firms could be compatible or incompatible with each other, and are
substitutes for each other. If they are compatible, expected network size is
the expected total output of both firms; if incompatible, the network is the
expected output of each firm. The inverse demand functions for the home and
*E ** *E * E
foreign firm are given by P(x,x N )andP (xx ,N),wherex,x and N
N*E are the outputs and expected network sizes of the home and foreign
firms, respectively. The superscript E denotes that these are the expected
levels of these variables. If the products are competible,
E *E E *E . . E E *E *E N =N=x+x .Ifthey are incompatible, N =xand N=x .Of
course, price, P, falls as x orx rises since the products are substitutes,
and rises with increases in the expected network size. Similarly, P rises
as N*E rises and falls as x orx* rise.11
Consumers are assumed to base their demand for a firm's product on the
expectations they hold about a firm's network size. Firms take these-10--
expectations as dependent on their output. They assume that a unit change
in x(x*) creates an c(c*) change in the expected domestic (foreign) output
with consequent effects on expected network size. The special case where
expectations about network size do not change as the firm's output changes
arises when £and equal zero. However, in general expectations are
perceived as being affected by firm's output. In addition, firms have
conjectures about how their opponent will react to changes in their output.
7 and denote the conjectural variations parameters of the domestic and
foreign firms.
Finally, expectations about network size must fulfill a consistency
condition that allows them to be tied down. A natural condition is that
expectations about the network sizes of the firms are fulfilled in
equilibrium. This defines a "fulfilled expectations equilibrium." It is
useful expositionally to be slightly more abstract at this time. An (e,e*)
fulfilled expectations equilibrium is said to occur when the expected
domestic output equals e times actual domestic output, and expected foreign
output equals e* times actual foreign output. This corresponds to a
* fulfilledexpectations equilibrium if both e and e equal one.
The profits of the domestic and foreign firms are given by:
(1) (1—t) P(x,x*,NE)x —c(x)and
(2) p*(x,x*,N*E)x* -c(x*)respectively.
* tis the tariff or subsidy imposed on the domestic firm, and c(.) and c (.)
arethe cost functions of the two firms. The first order conditions when
the networks of the two products are incompatible are given by:—11—
(3) (1-t)NP1 + 7P2 + £P3)X + P) -ct=0,
** *** ** *'
(4) (P1y +P2+cP3)x +P -c =0,
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. The subscript 1, for example,
identifies the first variable as being the relevant one. If the products
are compatible, they are given by:
(3') (1-t){[P1 + + (c + cY)P3]x + P) -c'=0
** * * * * * *'
(4') (P1' + + (c + y c)]x + P -c=0.




must be met. Substituting (5) and (6) into (3) and (4) or (3') and (4') gives
two equations to solve for the only two variables, x and x in these equations.
Equations (5) and (6) then define expectations. Therefore, the effect of a
change in "t" on the endogenous variables x and x in such an equilibrium can be
found by performing comparative statics analyses on (3) and (4) or (3') and
(4'), after substituting (5) and (6) into them. Let the actual change in x
as x changes be given by g. This is defined by equations (4) or (4'), after
equations (5) and (6) have been substituted into them. It also equals the
*
dx dx
ratio of the comparative statics terms, and
The problem is now fully specified. Firms maximize their profits
taking any taxes and subsidies by the government as given. These—12—
first-order conditions for the firms define their best-response functions
which gives two equations in x, x, E and x*E. The condition that
the equilibrium be an (e,e*) fulfilled expectations equilibrium gives
another two equations in these four variables. This allows solving for the
endogenous variables x, x, E and x*E.
The question of optimal government policy can now be analyzed. Since
the firms compete in a third market, welfare consists only of domestic
profits,12 and is given by W =P(x,x*,NE)x-c(x).
t does not affect welfare directly, since transfers between the
government and firms cancel out, but does affect welfare via its effect on
the endogenous variables. Hence,
(7) =((P12g3e)x
+P-







if they are compatible.
Using the first—order condition (3) in (7) and (3') in (7') allows the









ifthe products are compatible.
The first—order conditions for an interior welfare maximum require (8)—13—
or (8') to be zero depending on whether the products are incompatible or
compatible. This gives the optimal policy assuming that second—order
conditions are met. notice that the optimal value of t depends on the
direction of both the wedge between conjectured and actual responses to own
output changes, (g-y), a la Eaton and Grossman, as well as on the difference
between the conjectured change in expected network size in response to own
output and the actual change. This difference depends only on (c-c) if
products are incompatible, but on the additional interaction term (ge*_yc*)
as well when products are compatible.
Consider first the case when products are incompatible. The difference
between g and y defines a reason for the government to set t 4 0. If g <
ande =c,the government should subsidize the domestic producer. This is
because the domestic firm is too pessimistic in its conjecture about the
foreign firm's behavior. If, for example, y =0and g <0,the usual
Cournot case, the domestic firm acts on the assumption that the foreign one
will keep its output fixed. However, since its opponent actually reduces
its output in response to any increase in domestic output, the domestic firm
should produce more. The government can ensure this by subsidizing the
domestic firm, as was pointed out by Eaton and Grossman.
The interpretation of (c-c) is similar. If e >c,the domestic firm
should be subsidized since the firm conjectures a smaller change in the
expectations of consumers about network size in response to output changes
than actually occurs. This leads them to produce too little. If, f or
example, firms take the expected network size as given, and a
fulfilled-expectations equilibrium is considered, there would be reason to—14—
subsidize the domestic firm. Expectations are likely to befixed in the
short run, and a fulfilled-expectation condition can be thoughtof as a
static way of incorporating the longer run into themodel.13 If firms tend
to take a short term view of the industry, as is implicitin £= 0,there is
a role for a government that is aware of the long-run consequencesto take
appropriate action.
The interpretation of the case with compatible products issimilar.
The only difference lies in the fact that any effect of atariff via the
network externality must include the effect on the foreign firm's expected
and actual output as well as that of the domestic firm. Noticethat e +ge*
is the actual change in the network size, while £+ isthe conjectured
change in the network size. This makes e and yinteract in the formula, but
allows the same interpretations to be made as done previously.
It is worth calling attention to a few points at this stage. First,it
should be noted that g is the slope of the foreign firm's best—response
function after imposing the expectations condition on it. Inthis it
differs from the analogous concept in the absence of any expectations.
therefore, even if e =£, theintroduction of expectations would tend to
make the assumption g =yeven stronger since g is not the slope of the best
response function of the foreign firmfor given expectations but when
expectations are fulfilled in the(e,e*) sense.
Second, if c =1=eand a firm fully takes into account the effects of
its actions on the network size, then in the case with incompatible products
the direction of optimal policy depends on the sign of g -yonly. Also
notice that the direction of the optimal policy when e =£ = 1=e*=(in—15—
the case of compatible products) is dependent on more than just the sign of
(g-y). If +
P3is positive, even if P2 is negative, the goods would
become effective complements due to the presence of network externalities.
In this case the incentives to subsidize would, of course, be reversed since a
decrease in output by a competitor hurts rather than helps a firm when the
goods are complements. Thus, if £ =£* = e*e =1,P2 +P3is positive,
and g <y=0,as in the Cournot case, the anticipation that the other firm
would keep its output fixed would be too optimistic if it really lowered it.
Obviously, the optimal policy would then be a tax which would correct the
firm's over—optimism.
Third, note that having compatible products tends to reduce the
desirability of a subsidy or a tax when g =y<0.Consider, for example,
the case where e =e*,c =bute >cand g =y<0.The direct effect of
a subsidy is beneficial since the firms underestimate the value of the
network externality. This is captured by the P3(e-c) term. A subsidy,
however, raises the foreign firm's network as well and tends to make it wish
to produce more. If g <0,this makes the domestic firm produce less. This
is captured by the term P3g(e*_C*). This works against the desirability of
a subsidy.
Thus, network externalities and expectations regarding the size of the
network affect optimal trade policy for oligopolistic industries in two
ways. First, the presence of expectations effects creates a wedge if there
are differences in the way the network externalities really work, as given
by e and e*, and the way they are expected to work, as given by c ande.
This wedge creates a role for government taxation/subsidization to correct-16-
this "distortion". Second, when the goods are compatiblethe existence of
network externalities in the absence of any expectationsdistortions tends
to make goods complementary. If in factthis effect dominates, the
direction of optimal policy is reversed.
In the next section, the importance of networkexternalities is shown
to create a reason why success in one market canhelp bring about success
in another. The analysis also provides an exampleof the idea that import






Multimarketinteractions are said to exist when decisions made in one
market spill over into another by affecting optimal decisions there. The
existence of such interactions is important for two reasons. First, it
creates problems in identifying unfair trade practices since purely
"domestic" policies could actually be trade policies in disguise. Second,
such interactions are bound to exist in markets with network externalities,
both because markets are linked by common networks and because expectations
about network size are a determinant of demand and can be affected by
domestic government policy.
The topic of multimarket oligopolies has aroused a great deal of
interest recently. The work of Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985),
Fundenberg and Tirole (1985), Krugman (1981), and Baldwin and Krugman (1986)
is closely related to this part of the paper. Baldwin and Krugman (1986)
focus on an important technological aspect of the production of 16K RAMS:
the fact that experience lowers the effective cost of production. This
creates multimarket interactions that are made important by the extremely
large experience effects estimated to occur in this industry. They develop
a model that is rich enough to capture the particular aspects of
learning—by-doing in this industry, and then use their theoretical structure
in a simulation exercise to see iftheeffective closure of the Japanese—18—
market to imports played a critical role in developing Japanese superiority
in this area. Their results indicate that this closure did indeed play a
critical role. In this spirit, any domestic policy that raised Japanese
domesti.c output of semiconductors could have significant trade effects.
Bulow, Geanakoplos and Kiemperer examine many examples of multimarket
interactions. The core of their work is their definition of "strategic
complements and substitutes" and they show that these play a crucial role in
the results of many oligopoly models.14 The approach of Eaton and Grossman
(1986) can also be extended, as is done in this paper, to better understand
such interactions in markets with the characteristics previously mentioned.
This approach provides a way of understanding multimarket interactions that
is complementary to that of Bulow, et al. (1985). It focuses on the wedges
created by differences between how firms expect the relevant variables to
affect profits and how they actually do so. These wedges create an
opportunity for possible government intervention.
While many possibilities for multimarket interactions have been
discussed, network externalities and expectations concerning network size
have been neglected. In what follows, this paper will first discuss
informally how such network externalities make "success" across markets
positively correlated and then examine in a more formal way the differences
in the roles played by expectations and network externalities in such
interactions.—19—
3.2 Network Externalities, Expectations, and Market Interactions
Both the existence of network externalities and expectations about them
create linkages between markets and give rise to the possibility that
government policy in one market can affect a firm's competitive edge in
another.
Consider for example a firm operating in two markets, a home and a
foreign market, and facing the same competitor in both of these markets.
Assume for concreteness that the two firms are Cournot multimarket
duopolists who produce incompatible products so that each firm's expected
network size is the size of its expected output in all its markets. A
fulfilled—expectations equilibrium15 where firms take expectations about
network size as given will be considered. Equilibrium is therefore
characterized by each firm maximizing profits by choosing its sales in each
market, taking as given its competitors' output and expectations about
network size. In order for expectations to be fulfilled, in equilibrium
each firm's total output must equal the expected network size as well.
Any subsidy on domestic sales will tend to raise total output of the
domestic firm and lower the total output of the foreign firm. In a
fulfilled—expectations equilibrium, greater output will lead to greater
expectations about the network size of the domestic firm and smaller
expectations of the foreign network size. This will help the domestic firm
and hurt the foreign firm in both markets. Notice that domestic policy has
international effects because of the role played by expectations. The same
kind of argument works even if firms do not take expectations as given but
assume they are equal to their total output, since greater sales in the—20-
domestic market raise marginal revenue in the foreign market due to the
effect via network externalities. Network externalities by themselves also
create multimarket interactions.
The preceding argument can be made clearer by using a series of
diagrams to illustrate the process.16 It can be verified that the same kinds
of effects occur even when the effects of output changes on expectations are
taken into account by firms. Some notation is required at this point to
help follow the diagrams used to illustrate the process by which these
multimarket interactions occur. Since the products are incompatible, each
firm's network consists of its total expected output in the two markets.
The firm's problem is, therefore, to:
Max it(x,yI x*,y*,NE) =r(x,x*,NE)+R(y,y*,NE)-c(x+y)
x,y
where x,y are output levels of the domestic producer in the two markets;x
and y are the competitor's outputs in the markets, and c is the constant
marginal cost of the home firm.17NE is the expected network size of the home
firm. The home firm's revenue functions in the two markets are r and R and
are assumed to have the usual properties, r2, r11, r12 <0and r3 >0.It is
**
alsoassumed that R2, R22, R12 <0and >0.The home firm takes x ,y and
NE as given. This is denoted by the profit function, it,beingconditional on
given values of these variables. Similarly, the foreign firm's problem is:
** * E ** *E ** *E
Max it(x,y Ix,y,N)= r(x,x ,N )+ R(y,y ,N ),
**xy
** * - C (x+y ).—21—
Therefore, equilibrium in the home market (depicted in Figure la), where the
revenue functions of the home and foreign firm are given by r andr*, is
characterized by the intersection of the best response functions, b, b*,
implicitly defined by ir =0and =0.Similarly, equilibrium in the
the foreign market (shown in Figure ib) is defined by Ity =0and 1T* =0.
Both these equations hold at the intersection of B and B* which are defined
by these equations. The usual stability conditions are also assumed in
Figures 1(a) and (b). These are equilibria only for the given expectations,
however. In addition, these expectations must be fulfilled. For a given
N*E, it is easy to verify that increases in NE shift the home firm's best
response function outwards in both markets and so raise its equilibrium
output in both markets. Therefore total output, N, of the domestic firm
rises with NE as shown in Figure 1(c) by N(NE) =NE.
What happens to "A" as N*E changes? Since an increase in N*E shiftsB*
and b* outward, it must reduce N for any NE. Thus, an increase inN*E
shifts N(NE) inwards so that the NE that is self fulfilling falls. This
relationship between the self fulfillingNE and N*E is depicted in 1(e) as
NE(N*E). Since the position of the two firms is symmetric, the same
arguments give another diagram, 1(d) analogous to 1(c), and another function
N*E(NE), depicted in 1(e), which for any NE gives the expectation of
N*E that is self—fulfilling. The intersection of these two loci, N*E(NE)
and NE(N*E), gives the set of expectations aboutNE and N*E which are
jointly self fulfilling. Once again, the relative slopes of these two
functions are as shown for stability reasons.
How would a subsidy program for production for the domestic affect a—22—
firm abroad? The direct effect of a subsidy with given expectations about
network size would be to shift the best-response function at home outwards
to b', as shown in 1(a). This raises total output of the domestic firm for
the given expectations. In fact, it is easy to show that total output rises
for any given expectations. Thus, for any N*E, N(NE) would shift to the
right, to a line such as N' in Figure 1(c). Hence, for anyN*E, the self
fulfilling expectation of NE would rise, or in other words,NE(N*E) would
shift outwards to a line such as NE, in Figure 1(e).
Moreover, since the subsidy reduces total foreign output with the
original set of expectations, it must reduce total foreign output for any
given set of expectations, or in other words it must shiftN*(NE) inwards to
as in 1(d). This reduces the self fulfilling expectation level of
N*E for any NE, so that N*E(NE) shifts in as well to N*E, which is shown in
1(e). Both the shifts in Figure 1(e) raise the jointly self fulfilling
level of NE and lower that of N*E. This shifts demand for the domestic
product out and the foreign product in in both domestic and foreign markets,
shifting the equilibrium in these markets to the points "f" and "F" from "a"
and "A" in 1(a) and 1(b), respectively.
A subsidy to the home firm in the home market raises expectations about
its network size, which raises its output in all markets. A similar effect
could easily be demonstrated even if firms completely take into account the
effects of output changes on expectations, because the size of the network
still connects the two markets.
Although this exercise shows how expectations and network externalities
can link markets and how a subsidy to domestic sales can raise foreign and- -
domesticsales, it does not say much about whether this subsidy is desirable.
Fortunately, the model developed in the previous section can be extended to
help answer these questions. The only modification that needs to be made is
to allow the firms to compete in two markets. The case where firms make
incompatible products is analyzed first. The results for compatible products
are similar and are presented more briefly later on.
The domestic (foreign) firm is assume to behave as if it believed that
a unit change in the domestic (foreign) network would lead to an £(c)
change in the expected network.'y and F are the conjectural variations
parameters for the domestic firm in the home and foreign market, and and
are the conjectural variations parameters for the foreign firm in the
home and foreign markets. r and R are the revenue functions of the domestic
firm in the domestic and foreign markets, respectively. r* and R* similarly
denote the revenues of the foreign firm in these markets. An (e,e*)
fulfilled expectations equilibrium is analyzed as before. Domestic
consumption of the domestic firm's output is taxed or subsidized by the




and ,r, the profits of the foreign firm, are given by:
*** *E ** *E ** * = r(x,x ,N )+ R(y,y ,N )- c(x +y ).


















(12)—= R+rR1+£R3 +£ r3-c=0.
By
-
Thefirst two equations define equilibrium in the home market giveny*,x*, and
the second two define equilibrium in the foreign market given x,y. The
condition that expectations be (e,e*) fulfilled requires that in addition
NE =e(x+y)and N*E =e*(x*+y*).These conditions will give the equilibrium
levels of x, x, y and y as a function only of t. Also, comparative statics
on the system will give the effects of changing t on these endogenous
*
dxdx y
variables. These comparative statics results are denoted by ,—, ,
* Ut UtUt
anddt
and can be found by substituting for the expectations conditions in
in equations (9) through (12) before performing the comparative statics
exercise.
For simplicity, the welfare function is broken into two components,
consumer surplus, W, and profits,W. The effects of t on the two
components are analyzed separately. This isolates the strategic multimarket
profit shifting effects, so that they can be analyzed clearly. Notice that
in (13), welfare depends on t only indirectly via the effect of t on the
endogenous variables.






Using equations (9) and (11) we can substitute for r1 —cand R1 —cin
equation (14). Also, let g be the actual change in relative to the actual
dy/dt .. dy/dt change in x as t changes. In other words, g
dx/dt'Similarly, G
dy/dt'










The first-order conditions for a welfare maximum will give t to be zero
optimally if actual changes due to a slight change in tariffs are equal to
the conjectural changes, or if g =y,G =r,and e =
Theprevious Cournot example can be analyzed in this framework by
setting y =0=r,G <0,g <0and c =0,e =1,h >0.Since (g-y)r2 >0
and (G—r)R2 >0,these effects call for a subsidy on domestic production.
This is the standard effect that depends on the form of competition, as
pointed out by Eaton and Grossman.
Moreover, notice that although the subsidy is imposed at home, the
effects of a subsidy are desirable in both markets. This is evident in
their being two terms, one for the domestic market and one for the foreign
market. A subsidy desirable in the home market since the domestic firm is
being too "pessimistic" in its conjectures at home which leads it to produce
too little and a subsidy alleviates this distortion. This effect is—26-
captured by the term (g-y)r2 being positive. A subsidy is desirable abroad
because it causes the domestic firm's output to rise in both markets so that
h is positive, and because the domestic firm is being too "pessimistic"
abroad as well. This is captured by the term (G-r)R2h being positive.
Expectations affect revenues in both markets. For this reason we see
the term r3 +R3
in equation (15). Since the effects of a subsidy are
direct at home and indirect abroad, we see the terms (1+h) multiplying the
term (r3+R3) in equation (15). Finally, since e -£ > 0in this case, firms
are too conservative in their estimate of the network benefits ofincreased
output. For this case, (r3+R3)(e-e)(1+h) is positive, since h is positive
and the expectation effect just reinforces the previous effects. Therefore,
the optimal policy would be a subsidy. This completes the analysis of
profit shifting in the Cournot example.
If c0,the sign of the term multiplying t in (15) is ambiguous.
However, as long as <0at t =0,similar arguments to those previously
made indicate the direction of welfare increasing policies from an initial
state of no taxes or subsidies on domestic consumption of the domestic good.
If, for example, firms over-estimate the effect of output on network
expectations so that e -£ < 0,and g ='yand G =r,then a small tax on
domestic consumption of the domestic firm's product will raise welfare from
the t =0welfare level.
It is clear from the expression for the change in welfare that the
optimal policy depends not only on the form of the strategic interaction, as
parameterized by F and r relative to g and G, but also on the sign of h. In
addition, it also depends on the distortions inherent in the expectations—27—
formulation.18
Now to turn to the effects on consumer surplus,
(16) =U[x,x, e(x+y), e*(x*+y*)) -r(x,x, e(x+y))
** * * * - r(x, x ,e(x +y )]
whereU(s) is the utility function being maximized.
Differentiating gives:
C c C C C









The four terms in brackets give the effect of changes in x, x, y and y
due to changes in t on consumer surplus. Since U1 =P,the inverse demand
function facing the domestic producer at home, U1 —r1,is positive.
Similarly, U2 -isalso positive. U3 -r3is positive/negative if an
increase in the network size raises utility more/less than it raises
revenues. The sign of this term is ambiguous and depends on the particular
specification of demand used. A useful interpretation, along the lines of
Spence (1976), can be made as follows.
If increments in network externalities are valued less for marginal
units than for all units on average, then U3 -ispositive. If the
increments in network externalities are valued more for marginal units than
for all units on average, then U3 -r3is negative. This is because-28--
(18) 1J3(x,x*, e(x+y), e*(x*+y*)] -r3(x,x, e(x+y))
=JXIJ (s,x, e(x+y)]ds —P3(x,x, e(x+y))x
=x(fxp(s x, e(x+y)]ds -P3(x,x, e(x+y)]).
The first term is the average willingness to pay for increments in the
network size over all units purchased while the latter is the willingness to
pay at the margin for increments innetwork size.2° The interpretation of
U4 -r
is similar to this. Also, r and r2 are negative since the goods are
substitutes. The effects of a tax or subsidy on consumer surplus can now be
analyzed.
Assume that a tax lowers x. Consumer surplus is affected through four
channels, x, x, y and y*, as shown. First consider theeffect via x
directly. A tax reduces x and since the fall in utility exceedsthe fall in
expenditure, this reduces consumer surplus. This is captured bythe term
U1 -r1
being positive. The fall in x also reduces the networksize. This is
captured by U3 -r3.If U3 —r3
is positive, the fall in the network size
will also reduce consumer surplus. If U3 -r3is negative, it will raise
consumer surplus. Since the goods are substitutes, <0and the fall in x
will raise the revenues of the foreign firm in the domestic market which,for
a given level of x*, will reduce consumer surplus.Therefore, the effect of a
tax via x reduces consumer surplus as long as U3 -r3>0.
* . .*
Nowturn to the effect via x .Ifthe fall in x raises x ,i.e.,g <0,
*
andU4 -r3
>0,then g(—) <0.A tax then raises consumer surplus via
ax
its effect of raising x
y effects consumer surplus only viaits effect on network size. If—29-
h >o,so that a tax reduces sales in both markets, then the effect via y also
reduces consumer surplus if U3 -r3
>0.
also affects consumer surplus only through its effect on network size.
If 0 <0, h >0,then the tax raises y thereby raising the network for the
*
foreignfirm and raising consumer surplus if U4 -r3
>0.
The total effect of a tax on consumer surplus is therefore rather
complicated and consumer surplus could rise or fall with a tax. For the
Cournot example previously discussed, if the average increase in the
willingness to pay associated with an increase in network size
exceeds the marginal increase in the willingness to pay, and direct effects
**
onsurplus via x and y outweigh the relatively indirect ones via x and y
a tax reduces consumer surplus. Thus, if a subsidy is called for due to
strategic considerations in maximizing W, it will also raise consumer
surplus.
Exactly the same procedure can be used to define the welfare effects of
a tax or subsidy when the products are compatible. The analogous
expression to equation (15) is somewhat formidable. With compatible
products W is given by:
* ** * ** = (1-t)r(x,x ,e(x+x+y+y )] +R[y,y ,e(x+x+y+y )] -c(x+y).
Then,
it c-Rc(1+y)






Notice that even with compatible products there is a role for subsidizing
domestic consumption of the domestic firm. If, for example, e -£ > 0,
9 =y<0,G =y<0,h >0, <0and ((l+g) +(1+G)h)>0,then >0
for "t" close to zero, so that a subsidy raises domestic profits. However,
with compatible products, some of the benefits of a larger network accrue to
the foreign firm, and even if e >c,it may not be worthwhile subsidizing
domestic consumption in order to shift profits. This is captured by the
fact that (l+g) +(1+G)his required to be positive as well in this case.
Also,
C * ** * **
W=U(x,x ,e(x+x+y+y )]- r(x,x ,e(x+x+y+y )]
** ** - r[x, x ,e(x+x+y+y )].
Therefore,
dWC **








It can, however, be analyzed as done for incompatible products.
The basic message of this section and the last one is fairly clear. If
firms tend to underestimate the benefits of output increases in creating
network externalities, there will be a role for government intervention both
to shift profits to domestic firms from foreign firms in a third market, and
to use subsidies on domestic sales to help their competitive position in
foreign markets where it may be illegal to offer such subsidies. In—31—
addition, such subsidies may also raise consumer surplus.
This should not be taken as a call for government action to subsidize
domestic production for the domestic market for at least three reasons.
First, governments may not be informed enough to identify a welfare
increasing policy. Second, even if a welfare increasing policy is
identified, the government may not be able to implement it since the
possibility of subsidization may unleash lobbying efforts which endogenously
determine the policy as well as waste resources. Third, foreign governments
may well retaliate with consequent possible losses for all parties.
However, since these domestic subsidies are legal under the GATT,
governments will be tempted to use them in the hope that they will be
beneficial. For this reason trade policy toward certain high tech
industries could easily be conducted in an extremely non-cooperative way
with consequent losses for all parties.—32-
Kala Krishna
Section 4
Other Features of HIQh Tech Industries
There are other characteristics of high tech industries that make this
sector special and pose difficulties f or the trading system. Another
feature of such industries, which is also related to the existence of
network externalities, is that firms have a choice of what product standards
to adopt or which network to link to. This choice is often posed ai one of
deciding whether to make one's product compatible with competitor's
products. This matter has at least two aspects that are relevant for trade
policy. The first is that in an effort to keep out competition, firms may
deny networks linkages to competitors by making their product incompatible
with products of foreign firms, thereby effectively impeding competition.
Often international competition is more effective in holding down excess
profits than domestic competition, given the size of some firms in
industries.
Aho and Aronson (1983) recognize this point. They point out that
"except for the United States and Canada almost all major countries provide
telecommunication services through government-owned or -controlled postal,
telegraph and telephone authorities. Neither group of countries is likely
to abandon their regulatory preferences; therefore, rules need to be
negotiated to allow for fair competition between public and private sector
firms" (Aho and Aronson, 1985, p. 147).
The second trade policy aspect of such compatibility decisions is that—33.-
trade restrictions in product lines where network externalities are
important may well affect the nature of compatibility choice. The manner in
which they might do so is not well—understood at present.
High tech industries are also characterized by high rates of
technological change and the presence of very significant rates of
experience effects. For example, the capabilities of a modern personal
computer worth $2,000 are equivalent to those of a mainframe computer that
cost several million dollars in the early seventies. Nor is the end in
sight for this technological revolution. Technological change has reduced
the real price of a Unit of computing capacity in the semi-conductor
industry by 99 between 1976 and 1984.21
In the semi-conductor industry there are also significant experience
effects. This comparative advantage in such industries can be "made"22 to a
large extent. This puts enormous pressure on governments to act to secure
the advantages brought by experience for domestic firms, since these
industries are likely to be critical ones, both economically and for
national security. Recent work by Baldwin and Krugman (1986) paints a
convincing picture using a simulation model, that current Japanese
superiority in semi—conductors may well be due to the effective closure of
the Japanese market to foreign firms that allowed Japanese firms to benefit
from experience effects.23 While this may lead to advantages for a country
if it is the only one operating such policies, it is likely to be mutually
destructive if all countries subsidize particular high tech industries to
gain an experience advantage.
Still another feature of high tech industries is their extremely high—34-
level of research and development expenditure and the related problem in
enforcing property rights, especially for software. Since counterfeiting is
becoming a significant trade problem for some high tech industries, it is
important to consider ways of regulating property rights optimally in this
area 24
Finally, there are likely to be large switching costs and coordination
problems in high tech industries where many possible standards are possible
ex-ante. For example, it has been suggested that although the DVORAK typing
board is more efficient than the QWERTY one,25 even allowing for retraining
costs, the latter remains the standard.26 This makes it important for
national policy on standards to be formulated at an early stage.—35—
Footnotes
1.For a discussion of the nature of such externalities, see Katz and
Shapiro (1985).
2.The classic example of this comes from the computer industry. Although
when the Macintosh came out it was universally regarded as a far superior
machine to the IBM PC, its main competitor, the expectation that the IBM
machines would ulitmately set the industry standard gave IBM a definite
competitive edge over Apple. See J. Pepper (1986) for a discussion of this.
3.See Dixit (1984) and (1985) and Grossman and Richardson (1985) for a
survey of this work.
4.In particular, the work of Eaton and Grossman (1986) and Bulow,
Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985) have contributed to this.
5.It is worth emphasizing that the government may not know which way to
precommit, and even if it does, it may not be able to credibly do so.
6.See Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985) and Fundenberg and Tirole
(1985) for more on this topic. Multimarket interactions exist when a firm's
behavior in one market affects its optimal behavior in another.
7.This could be accomplished by a domestic consumption subsidy on the
firm's product or a production subsidy coupled with a requirement that the
subsidy be rebated if the product is exported.
8.This is of course assuming no retaliation!
9.See Bresnehan (1981), Perry (1982), and Kamien and Schwartz (1983) on
conjectural variations and consistent conjectural variations. There may be
significant problems with existence of equilibirum in such models, which are—36-
notaddressed in this paper.
10. The usual objections to conjectional variations in game theory, such as
the lack of an extensive form associated with the game, are important to note.
Nevertheless it remains a useful tool.
11. In general N*E and NE could also enter P andP respectively, and this
can easily be incorporated in the framework provided. A model which provides
a special case of the one presented is that of Katz and Shapiro (1985). In
their model goods are perfect substitutes for each other so that inverse
demand depends on total output and own expected network size.
12. Of course, the usual assumption of a numeraire good is made.
13. There are often multiple equilibria in such models as a result of the
usual bootstrapping phenomena associated with expectations. That is, there
may be many expectations that are consistent in the sense of being
self-fulfilling. It remains possible, however, to do comparative statics by
choosing any one of these, since they are locally unique.
14. A firm is said to regard its product as a strategic substitute
(complement) for its competitors if more aggressive play by its rival lowers
(raises) the marginal profitability of more aggressive play by itself.
15. The assumptions made in the diagrams ensure that the equilibrium is
unique. There may in general be many fulfilled-expectations equilibria.
There are usually only a finite number of these, which ensures local
uniqueness of an equilibrium.
16. These diagrams are simlar to those in Krugman (1982).
17. This is because non-constant marginal costs can provide another link
across markets. See Krugmari (1982) for an analysis of such interactions.—37—
18. In addition, when e, and/or R3 are large enough, the term premultiplying
t need not be positive. This must be taken into account as well.
19. As usual, a numeraire good is assumed to exist. Demand arises from
utility maximization subject to a budget constraint. Also, all profits and
tax revenues are returned to consumers in a lump sum manner.
20. It is assumed that P3(o, x*, e(x+y)) =0,which is reasonable since if no
units are purchased, there is no reason to value increments in network size.
21. See Baldwin and Krugman (1986).
22. See Krugman (1985) for a model that shows how comparative advantage can
be "made.t'
23. Baldwin and Krugman (1986) argue that this was destructive even in the
Japanese case.
24. Recent work by Grossman and Shapiro (1986) is a step in this direction.
25. See, for example, David (1984).
26. See Farrell and Saloner (1985) for a model that addresses such inertia.—38-
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